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MANDATORY MINIMUMS: FINE IN PRINCIPLE,
INEXCUSABLE WHEN MINDLESSt
G. ROBERT BLAKEv*
Judge Martin, Mr. Mateja, Ladies and Gentlemen:
Does the time fit the crime?
I feel like I'm President Clinton trying to get out of trouble
by asking what "is" is.
What I now must ask is: What does "fit" mean?
And that all depends on what the purpose of a criminal
sanction is.
Or maybe I should say purposes.
We can at least begin to talk about that question in terms of
the generally accepted purposes of the criminal law.
I. RETRIBUTION
Will the time fit the crime if the purpose of a criminal sanc-
tion is retribution?
One of the great difficulties the Federal Sentencing Com-
mission faced when it tried to set policy for sentences was to
determine the proper level of retribution, or, as it is sometimes
called, just deserts. And the Commission found that people's
judgment about the appropriate sentence level varied with age
and gender. For example, if you take the highest level of crime,
and call that homicide, or murder, and you give it a number, and
rank the other various crimes below it, the Commission found
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something you might not have anticipated, though you might
not be surprised when I tell it to you, that is, young women
ranked rape higher than murder. In fact, the difference between
men and women did not even-off until they got to about my age,
and that is way up there. So, if you want to make the punishment
fit the crime with a theory of retribution, you have to say retribu-
tion from whose perspective? The Sentencing Commission
finally figured out, in short, that you can't use a number for retri-
bution that satisfies everybody.
So, retribution won't work.
II. DETERRENCE
Does the time fit the crime if the purpose of the criminal
sanction is deterrence?
Well, this is not supposed to be all that difficult. I can give
you a scientifically valid algorithm for it: Deterrence equals swift,
sure, and severe punishment. Absolutely. That works. The diffi-
culty is that nobody knows how to put integers into each cate-
gory: swift, sure, and severe. And, I'm really surprised to hear my
good friend Judge Martin and my good friend Bill Mateja from
the Office of the Deputy Attorney General in the Department of
Justice suggest we know much about deterrence. We don't. The
literature on deterrence usually, if not universally, ends up saying
that we need more data to determine if the theory of deterrence,
in fact, works-certainly to measure whether any single penal
policy, like minimum mandatory sentences, actually affect the
general crime rate.
I'm also struck by the fact that we are talking tonight princi-
pally about the federal government. But then we shift, and with-
out a credible segue, we talk about state governments. We are, as
they say, mixing apples and oranges. First, we talk about federal
sentencing. Then, we talk about state crime rates. They really
are two animals with remarkably different colors.
Let me make it concrete for you. The federal government
has maybe 35,000 people in its entire law enforcement system-
meaning, cops in some sense-from F.B.I. agents to fish and wild
life officers. That is about the number of police officers in the
City of New York. Which is another way of saying that the whole
federal law enforcement establishment couldn't keep peace in
New York for a single day and night-much less the rest of the
United States-and do anything about terrorism or anything else
on its ample plate. If you're expecting the federal government to
do anything but bring "show prosecutions," identifying a bad per-
son and locking him up-identifying a Mafia boss and locking
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him up-I think you're just simply mistaken. The federal gov-
ernment doesn't have the resources to do it, and nobody is pre-
pared, in the foreseeable future, to finance the immense job of
handling crime in the United States.
In fact, in light of the challenge of terrorism, the federal
government is increasingly getting out of things that the states
also do. And I, for one, am glad. The states can't do interna-
tional terrorism. Only the federal government can. A lot of what
the federal government does, and is still doing, could just as eas-
ily be done at the state and local level. Let's get the federal gov-
ernment out of that sort of business, and let it do what only it can
do, at least what I hope and pray it will be able to do in this
increasingly dangerous world of international terrorism.
So, when you talk about crime in the United States, you're
talking about crime at the state and local level, not about federal
criminal law enforcement.
So, much of the sentencing analysis, focused on the federal
government, which you've heard about tonight, is simply irrele-
vant to state and local experience, that is to say crime in America.
III. INCAPACITATION AND REHABILITATION
As retribution focuses on the conduct, not the person, reha-
bilitation and incapacitation focus on the person, not the con-
duct. But if you take your policy of incapacitation/rehabilitation
seriously, most murderers should be released; they should
receive no jail time at all! In fact, most homicides arise out of a
triangle, a love triangle; a husband, a wife, and a paramour. You
can add in alcohol and drugs, too, if you want to. In fact, most
murders occur under circumstances in which deterrence makes
little or no sense. How do you deter a crime of passion, when the
blood of the killer runs hot, which is true, almost by definition, in
most homicides? Murderers also don't recidivate. (Anyway, I
suppose that if somebody else marries a murderer, you could
always say he or she assumed the risk!) Murderers are also model
prisoners. If you are only talking about rehabilitation, they don't
belong in jail. So, if your express purpose in sentencing is inca-
pacitation/rehabilitation, then the fact that we don't sentence
murderers-never have sentenced murderers-on that basis is
just another way of saying we have always followed a policy of
"under-the-table" retribution. Truth be known, we also don't
know how to rehabilitate, just like we don't know how to deter.
Having a laudable goal is not the same thing as having the know-
how to achieve it in the world in which we, in fact, live. And
knowing what we don't know is one necessary form of wisdom.
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But, at least, we know that incapacitation keeps offenders
from offending while they are in jail, except on one another, but
even here, we are not going to give all offenders, no matter what
the crime, life sentences. Our intuitive notions of just deserts
prohibit that, and rightly so. If we really wanted to incapacitate
as a crime control policy, we would give most kids twenty years or
more when they first offended. (We now always give them
another chance because we hope (over reason) that we can reha-
bilitate them.) All of the studies show that criminals have a crim-
inal career that roughly tracks the rise and fall of testosterone in
their systems. When they get a little older, they just don't offend
anymore! They just don't have the stuff for it anymore. Take
me. Can you imagine me going into a bank, vaulting the
counter, and running off with the money? I hardly run anywhere
anymore! Lock people up, sure, but you are going to have to let
them out sometime. Then, they will go right back to the only
thing they know: crime.
Incapacitation/rehabilitation is a policy, too, that hardly
works, at least, most of the time.
Knowing that, too, is wisdom.
So much for incapacitation/rehabilitation.
What the Sentencing Commission finally found that it had
to do was not sentence under any of these philosophical systems.
In fact, what it did was examine the existing sentencing prac-
tice-actual sentences imposed-and it found wide variations in
sentences. So the Commission took the tops off and filled in the
valleys; it just smoothened out present sentences, no too high
sentences, no too low sentences. But that is another way of say-
ing that we can't figure out whether we, as a society, want retribu-
tion, deterrence, or incapacitation/rehabilitation, or a little of
each, or none of the above. The Commission came, rightly, in
my judgment, to the conclusion that it might just as well "ration-
alize" current practice, whatever that is, and get on with whatever
it is that we are doing, and leave the rest to the philosophers in
academia.
IV. WHo DECIDES WHAT "FITS?"
Putting philosophy to one side, who decides in our society if
the time fits the crime?
The truth of the matter is, if you look at it carefully, every
participant in the criminal justice system has input on how much
time fits the crime.
Let's start with the legislature. The legislature could, of
course, articulate a purpose for crime control, if it wanted to,
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that is, if the legislators could figure out where our social consen-
sus rests. The fact is we do not have a social consensus about any
aspect of the criminal justice system, federal, state, or local.
In the federal system, at least, without a definition of the
basic elements of crime, specified sanctions, and a court with
jurisdiction to try it, the federal system cannot process anti-social
behavior as criminal.
So, in the first instance, the legislature, that is, Congress
defines crimes and sets the sanctions.
The difficulty with that simple system is that when you
define a crime you necessarily define it with a logical universal,
for example, "Robbery." The truth of the matter is 9/11 was a
"robbery." In the federal system, it would be called "hijacking,"
but basically the terrorists stole the airplanes, using force or vio-
lence. That is at least a "robbery." I suppose you could also call
it "kidnapping," "arson," and "murder."
So, the tragedy of the Twin Towers could, at least in theory,
be tried in the Manhattan County Supreme Court under the New
York Penal Code.
Federally, it was also a RICO.
Laugh if you want to. I know people who say I've never seen
a RICO I didn't like. Actually, I'm going to be in court on Mon-
day representing the defendant in a civil RICO. I can tell you,
that it is a RICO that I do not like.
So, 9/11 was a RICO. Al Qaeda is the "enterprise,"; "rob-
bery," "kidnapping," "arson," and "murder" form a "pattern,"
particularly in light of previous incidents and Al Qaeda's stated
purpose to commit acts of terrorism in the future. And, you
could get up to a life sentence under RICO.
The problem, of course, is that we don't have any defend-
ants in hand to prosecute. I suppose that we could always do
with 9/11 what we did with General Manuel Noriega and his
drug traffic operation. We sent the Marines into Panama to
arrest him, and we brought him back to Miami for trial, and he is
now serving a sentence under RICO. And I suspect, if we could
find Osama bin Laden, and, putting national security issues
aside, if we wanted to try him, we could try him for a RICO.
In any event, if 9/11 is a "robbery," and it is, so also is a kid
with a stick taking a bike away from another kid in Central Park.
That, too, is a "robbery."
So, your logical universal, "robbery," in fact, fits radically dif-
ferent situations, and as long as we speak the English language, it
is always going to be that way. The problem is that we think and
talk in logical universals, but we act in the face of particulars.
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That is one of your biggest sentencing problems. We cannot
set an exact sentence for every crime in advance without setting it
inappropriately too high at the low end and too low at the high
end. That is why, traditionally, we set a range of sentences, 0 to
20, and gave judges discretion in light of the facts of particular
cases to fix the sentence somewhere in the authorized range.
You can, of course, as Congress has foolishly done, set a high
mandatory minimum for an offense, but that mandatory mini-
mum is going to come right up against the logical universal prob-
lem. You have one fact situation in mind when you create the
high mandatory minimum, but the first person prosecuted under
an offense having a high mandatory minimum sentence will fall
at the lower range of the logical universal.
Judges are not machines that can be preprogrammed to do
justice in individual cases. You need to give them the opportu-
nity to exercise judgment, applying it to a particular situation.
The Greeks called it "wisdom." The middle ages called it "pru-
dence." We call it 'judgment." It means the same thing. We
think in universals, but we act in light of particulars. So, what
our logical universal means in particular situations is a matter of
'judgment." You cannot get away from that. Our minds just do
not work any other way. It is foolish to think anything else. High
mandatory minimum sentences are inevitably unjust in a signifi-
cant number of instances to which they logically apply. You
might just as well try to paint the wind. Period. End of story.
So, the legislature can set the sentences in defining crimes
and setting punishments. Well, the prosecutor can set them, too.
It doesn't make any difference what the legislature does. The
prosecutor is the one who decides what to charge. You cannot
compel him to charge a particular offense. I heard tonight that
the DOJ has issued instructions to the Assistant United States
Attorneys to charge the offense with the highest level of punish-
ment before they start the plea bargain process, a process that
undermines any sentencing policy anyway. Well, that, too, is an
effort to paint the wind. Prosecutors just don't operate that way.
They, too, at least in the field, have the good sense to try to do
what is right, at least in the vast majority of cases. Directions out
of Main Justice do not always control what happens in the field,
particularly when they do not make sense in particular situations,
which is what all AUSAs deal with every day anyway.
The federal parole board used to set the sentence before the
Sentencing Commission got into the act. A judge would set one
sentence, but the parole board would automatically cut that by
one-third-and maybe more. The board could-and did-rem-
edy sentences that were too high. Unfortunately, it could not
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remedy sentences that were too low. At least at the federal level,
the parole board is basically out of business. Indeterminate
sentences are dead. Now, we have truth in sentencing; we call it
determinate sentencing. What the judge imposes, with minor
exception, is what the prisoner serves.
The president can, of course, set sentences through the
exercise of the pardoning power. Normally, that is done through
the pardon attorney's office in Main Justice. Granting pardons is
one way of dealing with a sentence that made no sense in the first
instance or makes no sense in light of present conditions. You
find out someone is actually innocent. DNA. That sort of thing.
You cannot get a new trial; it is too late for newly discovered evi-
dence. The president can remedy that sort of miscarriage ofjus-
tice. But the pardoning power itself sometimes does not make
sense. As President Clinton taught us so well, or ill, you can set
the sentence of just about anybody without going through the
pardon attorney in Justice or getting the recommendations of
anyone else with pardons on your last day in office.
Who else sets sentences?
Well, truth be known, juries set sentences. If you want to
impose capital punishment, you have to get by ajury in this coun-
try. That means juries set sentences, capital and otherwise. They
do it in other situations. Most of our crimes are stacked on top
of one another. You have capital murder, murder, manslaugh-
ter, etc. When the jury comes back, having been given a lesser
offense instruction, it can return any offense-read punish-
ment-it wants to return. You cannot do anything about it.
Jurors set the sentence when they choose between manslaughter
and murder or aggravated murder.
Let's talk about it. The good judge will tell the jury to assess
which offense to return in terms of its elements and the facts, but
every jury worth its salt worries about what the sentence is going
to be. Tell me why "he-said, she-said" rape charges are the most
difficult on which to get jurors to return guilty verdicts? The jury
is worrying about what happens .to the defendant, particularly
with the high level of sentence we now have for "rape," which, of
course, has to cover on one end of the spectrum a rape where a
stranger breaks into the women's house and rapes her at knife
point and at the other end of the spectrum covers what is now
called euphuistically "date rape."
Let's take Kobe Bryant's trial; I'll go out on a limb and say
that he'll be found not guilty. Not entirely because he is a celeb-
rity, though that is factor, but because the impact on him will be
taken into consideration and factored in when the jury judges
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her credibility. The issues are legally separate. She is credible or
not whatever happens to Bryant. But jurors are not lawyers that
can separate in their minds those sorts of decisions. They are
people from the real world. In an ideal world, they would judge
her credibility and then the judge would set the sentence, how-
ever the law permits him to do it. In fact, credibility determina-
tions sometimes reflect sentencing considerations.
They do that, too, when smart juries know about high
mandatory minimums. If ajury knows about them, and it thinks
a mandatory minimum sentence, if applied, would be unjust, you
will get a not guilty verdict-into the teeth of the facts and the
law.
Aren't juries neat? Thank God for juries! They will do the
right thing, even if the legislator, the prosecutor, and the judge
do not. That is why the Founders put them in the Sixth Amend-
ment. That is wisdom, too.
Finally, judges, of course, set sentences. They can set them
within a range as a matter of discretion with no standards and no
review. Pure discretion. That's what the federal system was
before 1987. Frankly, that was inconsistent with every system in
the world. When I was up on the Hill, we were thinking about
appellate review of sentencing, an appellate review of sentencing,
not only down, but up. We had the Library of Congress do a
worldwide survey for us, and it found that we were the only coun-
try that did not have some kind of appellate review of sentences,
both up and down. So that when our judges had unfettered dis-
cretion, they were unique in the world, and that is another way of
saying that they were "lawless."
That is the blunt truth of the matter, though federal judges
don't like it when professors tell them that.
So, Congress put a stop to that with the creation of the Sen-
tencing Commission that created the infamous, at least among
judges, sentencing guidelines. They are a compromise between
"who" the defendant was, and what he "did." For the "who," you
look to his criminal record. For the "did," you look to the crime
he committed. You rob a bank, that's "robbery." You rob a bank
of $10,000, that's a different level of "robbery." You rob a bank,
stealing $10,000 and you use a gun, that's even worse. You bal-
ance those two off. You get a "heartland" point on a graph of"who" that goes across and "did" that goes up. You can see the
graph in your mind. One side up, the other side across. That
graph cuts off the tops and cuts off the bottoms of sentences.
The judge then sentences within a much narrower range, the so-
called "heartland," unless special factors are present, and he or
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she feels that a departure up or down is warranted, but then the
judge has to state his or her reasons, and the sentence may be
appealed by either the defendant or the prosecutor. That is
called measured justice.
You may also still have a mandatory minimum. For example,
RICO used to be 0 to 20. If you had a RICO conspiracy, and a
RICO substance offense, it would have been possible to get two
twenty-year sentences that could be stacked, that is, imposed,
consecutively. So, you really had the possibility of forty years.
Incidentally, the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
in England, a long, long, time ago, suggested that any sentence
in excess of twenty years is the same thing as a death sentence; it
just destroys a person as a human being. If any sentence is
imposed and actually served for twenty years or higher, the per-
son is functionally no longer a human being; he is and reduced
to a shell of a human.
So, when you hear of a sentence of forty, fifty years, it is
bizarre.
Simply, bizarre.
When you hear me say that, recall that no one has ever said
I'm soft on crime!
So, is anything *in principle wrong with mandatory mini-
mums? No. They make sense. For example, RICO now is 2.5-3
years. That is a decent and wholly defensible mandatory mini-
mum. In fact, given the requirements of the statute, involvement
with a criminal group, multiple offenses, that actually sounds
light, that is, only 2.5-3 years.
But that is not the world in which we live in today. Tonight,
you have heard from Judge Martin and Mr. Mateja. In fact, the
current federal sentencing scheme is polluted, through and
through, with a mindless system of high mandatory minimum
sentences that is perverse in its design and impart.
I was on the Hill when much of this stuff went through. And
I have had contact with the people on the Hill and from the
Department since. It is not the rational world you heard
described by Mr. Mateja. Judge Martin's version is much closer
to the truth. In fact, the reason the Sentencing Commission was
established was that everybody on the Hill who thought about it
realized that Congress, left to its druthers, would not produce a
rationally defensible system of sentencing.
Could not do it.
And we all knew it!
It would end up a politically hot potato. Nobody wanted
anything to do with it.
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So, Congress gave the hot potato to the Sentencing Commis-
sion because they couldn't do it.
But one of the unanticipated consequences in giving it to
the Sentencing Commission, which suddenly surfaced for Con-
gressional staffs, was that everybody saw what was actually going
on in sentencing. Congressional staffs then found out from their
bosses that they could reach into the Sentencing Guidelines and
tweak them, and tweak them for political purposes, not for
rational sentencing purposes.
So, basically, what we have in at least two substantive areas is
mindlessly high minimum mandatory sentences that are ration-
ally indefensible-except in a political campaign when you deal
only in sound bites.
One is guns. The issue has little to do with violence; it has
everything to do with gun control. The National Rifle Associa-
tion wants to take the position, "Don't control guns. Control the
use of guns." So, to show that it is not soft on crime, the NRA
supports high mandatory minimums for offenses committed with
a gun, but no gun control. This is ideology, not crime control, or
a rational sentencing policy.
Ideology not crime control.
The other area is drugs. Do not get me wrong. I'm for a
drug control system. I'm not in favor of the decriminalization of
drug use by any means. But the society we live in is close to hys-
terical about drugs. Our current drug sentencing policy, at least
in part, goes back to a single instance. Len Bias, a college basket-
ball star, overdosed on drugs. Suddenly, we had high mandatory
minimums for crack cocaine. And if you have high mandatory
minimums for crack cocaine, but not high mandatory minimums
for powdered cocaine, suddenly that means that when a prisoner
gets into jail, he suddenly finds out that crack, which is a lower
class, black drug, gets a higher sentence than the sentence for
powdered cocaine, which is a white, upper class drug; it rightly
produces a feeling of discrimination, and it actually results in vio-
lence in the prisons.
The Department of Justice is afraid to develop a policy on
the issue for fear of appearing soft on crime, as are most of the
people on the Hill. Everybody knows that it is terribly wrong, but
no one has the intestinal fortitude to stand up for what is right.
We had a consensus once-and this is before this Administration
got into power-between the Sentencing Commission and the
Department ofJustice; we were going to go up to the Hill, and we
were going to even out sanctions for crack cocaine and powdered
cocaine. At the last minute, the White House learned that if
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Clinton supported it, the Republicans on the Hill would dump
on him as "soft on crime." It was all over. The consensus fell
apart, and nothing was done.
So, what we have is a bidding war. "Are you against drugs?
You want five years? I'm going to be more against drugs than you
are, and I'm going to go for ten." The high mandatory mini-
mums just built up. It is the same thing with guns. I want to
carry my gun. If you use a gun in a crime, I want you to go to jail
"forever." That way I can keep my gun, and I am not soft on
crime, because I support high mandatory minimum sentences
for those who commit crimes with guns.
No gun control, though a majority of Americans support it,
but lots of high mandatory minimum sentences for those who
commit crimes with guns.
It is all just mindless.
Mindless.
Let me talk a minute or two about the notion that somehow
our federal criminal justice policy has had a substantial impact
on actual crime that is committed in this country. In fact, we
don't really know, as social scientists, anything of importance
about deterrence, certainly to the point where we can tweak
sentences up or down and produce measurable results on indi-
vidual crimes. In fact, do you want to know what the single most
effective crime control policy has been in this country? It has
been our policy of abortion on demand. Let me just speak up
and witness to the truth. We kill approximately one million
babies every single year. What's the impact of that? Well, it
means we have a million less teenagers in fourteen or fifteen
years after that. And, who commits the most crimes in this coun-
try? Teenagers. The single most effective policy for crime con-
trol, therefore, has been abortion on demand. Are you in favor
of abortion on demand to control crime? That's anticipatory
capital punishment of the innocent for any crime that they might
commit if born. I don't think anybody supports that. But the
unanticipated result of a social policy of abortion on demand is
the reason, as much as anything else, and it is measurable, cer-
tainly more so than any particular penal policy, like high
mandatory minimums at the federal level for guns or drugs, for
our national declining crime rates.
I've discussed what I think is good, and I've indicated what I
think is bad. Do we have any remedies for what I've described
for you? Frankly, I don't think one exists. Crime definition is
limited by the nature of language. Sentencing policy is ulti-
mately a question of politics, politics of the worst sort: demagogy,
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pure and simple. As long as language is what it is, and politicians
are what they are, that is, they have a stake in crime control, we
will have to live with something like the present federal system. It
has been true at least since 1968 when Nixon decided to run for
sheriff. The Republicans found out they could get in power rid-
ing the hobby horse of crime control, and our good friend Mr.
Clinton decided that he would be just like President Nixon. He,
too, would be in favor of capital punishment. You will recall back
during his first campaign he went home to Arkansas to sign a
death warrant. Suddenly, no difference existed between Demo-
crats and Republicans on crime control. They both are against
it. That was the beginning of the bidding war where each side
fought each other on the same ground.
Do I see a remedy? Yes, but it is outside of the "overt" politi-
cal system. I do not like activist federal judges, of the right wing
or the left wing; it is all a matter of which knee jerks; it is six of
one and a half dozen of the other. But the only solution I can
see is that eventually the Supreme Court is going to have to have
the intestinal fortitude to step in and do something about mind-
lessly high mandatory minimums. The irony today is the Court
stepped in on capital punishment way back with its Furman' opin-
ion in 1972, though it has back peddled somewhat since then, so
you have an Eighth Amendment right to have the courts review
the rationality of the application of capital punishment. The
Court has also recently stepped in and imposed limitations under
the Eighth Amendment for forfeitures, not the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment Clause, but the Excessive Fines Clause. It did
that in its Bajakajian2 opinion in 1998. Forfeitures can't be min-
dless, just like capital punishment can't be mindless. The irony
today is that you have judicial supervision of legislative enact-
ments in the interests of life and property, but not liberty. I
don't see how that can rationally continue. The Supreme Court,
most recently, in its Locky& opinion last year, dealing with the
three strikes and you're out, had the chance to do something
about a mindlessly high mandatory minimum sentencing policy.
At least, it was honest enough to say that its jurisprudence on
cruel and unusual punishment in the imposition of a liberty sanc-
tion "left something to be desired." Unfortunately, the Court did
not step in and give us "something to be desired." I'm afraid-
just afraid-that the Court is afraid of becoming the judiciary
committee for fifty states, or that it will end up becoming a review
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
3. Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
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board or a parole board for fifty states. The Court just doesn't
want the business. Currently, the Court is afraid to take a princi-
pled position against mindlessly high mandatory minimum
sentences; it is because of a fear of the increase in its business. I
think the Court knows, too, that it could not make any more
sense of a general sentencing policy for the nation than the Sen-
tencing Commission could for the federal government. But the
Court did not have to go that far; it could have struck down the
mindlessly high minimum mandatory sentence without giving
everybody a review of every sentence. Surely, it is capable of draft-
ing an opinion that could do that! Eventually, however, the
Court is going to have to step in and say that mindlessly high
mandatory minimums are unconstitutional.
I eagerly await the day.
Thank you.

